Say What?: A volunteer is worth twenty pressed men / An army marches on its stomach

[chiroho.livejournal.com]

In this edition of Say What? we’re looking at two expressions which have military origins, but can be equally well applied in a more general sense. You may be familiar with both, though not necessarily with the meaning or the origin, so let’s jump right in.


A volunteer is worth twenty pressed men

The origin of this proverb is in the early 18th century, a time when the Royal Navy would often have groups of sailors armed with cudgels, colloquially called "press gangs", travel the areas around ports with the objective of impressing, or forcing, men with some sort of nautical experience into military service. This practice started in the 1660s and continued until after the defeat and abdication of Napoleon Bonaparte in 1814. Impressment was required because, during that period, the British government did not conscript its subjects into military service. Of course, just because a man was clubbed over the head and dragged away only to wake up in the bowels of a sailing ship did not make him a good sailor. Hence in 1705, T. Hearne noted in his Journal for 31 Oct (published in Remarks & Collections in 1885) that:

Tis said my Lord Seymour presently after Mr. Smith was pronounc'd Speaker, rose up, and told then, Gentlemen; you have got a Low Church man; but pray remember that 100 Voluntiers are worth 200 press’d men.

As you can see, the ratio of volunteers to pressed men was much lower in this example, just one to two, and that number has varied over the years, with Rudyard Kipling in Captains Courageous in 1897 indicating that "one volunteer was worth five hirelings", and M. M. Kaye in Shadow of the Moon (1977) saying "one volunteer was worth three pressed men". Regardless of the numbers used, the concept is that someone who volunteers for a task is likely to put a much greater effort into it than one or more other people forced to perform that same task.

The expression can be worked fairly readily into your stories, particularly in a situation where it's believed that a small group can have a bigger impact than a large one.

"Gibbs," Ziva said quietly, "I have identified eight crew members protecting the weapons shipment."
"Tony and Ziva, take the forward gangway; McGee, you're with me. We’ll go on my mark," Gibbs replied.
"But there are only four of us." McGee's quiet tone was marked by his concern.
"Haven’t you heard the expression, probie?" Tony said, smirking. "One volunteer is worth two pressed men, and they're not doing this by choice."

An army marches on its stomach

This proverb is attributed to both Napoleon Bonaparte and Frederick the Great, and is unusual in English due to the figurative reference to the stomach. The first published reference to the expression is from Windsor Magazine in January 1904, which printed:

'An army marches on its stomach.' 'C'est la soupe qui fait le soldat.' These Napoleonic aphorisms... have been increasingly appreciated by our war office.

Literally translated from French, the expression says 'this is the soup that makes the soldier', which makes the meaning a little clearer -- without soup, you don't have a soldier. So the inference is that the supplies and services which keep an army in the field are just as important as the soldiers who do the actual fighting. This was demonstrated through Napoleon's strategies, which were unusual at the time, in how he grouped and manoeuvered his forces while on campaign.

The expression can be used by any character looking to explain that there’s more to any sort of job than just the work itself. For example:

"Tony," McGee whined, "why do you always snack so much when we’re on a stakeout?"
"An army marches on its stomach, McGrumpy. Gotta be well supplied, or you’ll never be ready when the time comes."

As you can see, while both expressions have military origins, there are definitely applications well beyond that. Just make sure that your volunteers are well supplied and supported, or they may not be that much more effective than those pressed into service.

Sources
Simpson, John and Speake, Jennifer (2008), A Dictionary of Proverbs. Oxford University Press.
Wikipedia – Impressment

Comments

[pathology-doc.livejournal.com]

I always thought the Kipling book was titled "Captains Courageous" (my father's bookshelf had a hardback copy that's possibly older than he was), the trailing adjective being a relatively archaic touch not generally seen these days.

"C'est le soupe..." seems better translated as "It's the soup...", rather than "This is the soup...", the latter implying to me that a specific type of soup was responsible.

In fact, for all that Napoleon is famous for his attention to staff work and logistic detail, his armies were famous (or rather, infamous) for living off the land they were passing through, at the cost of the inhabitants. He paid the price for this in Spain and Russia.

Just make sure that your volunteers are well supplied and supported, or they may not be that much more effective than those pressed into service.

Ardent, well-trained and well-motivated volunteers can and will endure the most horrific privations before knuckling under. Try asking sullen and resentful conscripts to do this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fort_Vaux), for example. Or perhaps to continue attacking after this (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_day_on_the_somme) has just happened to almost half the attacking force. No conscript army could have done that, and in this day and age it's arguable that even a regular professional army couldn't do it either unless the fate of the world were literally at stake.

[chiroho.livejournal.com]

You're right on the name of the Kipling book. I had somehow swapped the words around when I wrote down the name after reading it in my source - perhaps because that's the more typical word order.

I lifted the translation from one of my sources, though you're probably right that "it's" makes more sense than "this is" - in the general sense of the proverb anyway.

Can't argue that Napoleonic French armies did live off the land, though the fact that Napoleon split his forces into self sustaining Corps did mean that it was a smaller force which was attempting to forage than if the army had been together. And while other armies of the period may have dragged along significant baggage trains, they amount of living off the land they did wasn't a whole lot less. That said, the vast majority of the destruction caused during the 1812 campaign was actually by the Russians, conducting a scorched earth policy to make things that much more difficult for the French.

Yes, well-trained and well-motivated volunteers will endure much, but there is only so much they can do without support. For example, five volunteers can't put up a shed any faster than ten conscripts if they haven't been given any materials.

Thanks for your comments.

[pathology-doc.livejournal.com]

That said, the vast majority of the destruction caused during the 1812 campaign was actually by the Russians, conducting a scorched earth policy to make things that much more difficult for the French.

Quite so. And this is exactly the way he paid for it in Russia - his logistic paradigm became invalid. He paid for it the other way in Spain.

[chiroho.livejournal.com]

And this is exactly the way he paid for it in Russia - his logistic paradigm became invalid.

I've also read that a significant reason for the French defeat was that it was actually a mild winter, so it got colder much later than normal - though once the weather changed it did so quickly. So rather than starting a withdrawal earlier before the worst weather hit, Napoleon left it too late. That and he was obviously already off his game, because the Napoleon of even 3 years earlier would never have considered a frontal assault like he did at Borodino when Davout was offering a flanking manoeuvre which could have saved many lives.

[pathology-doc.livejournal.com]

I agree there were many, many factors that led to the Russian disaster; I was just looking at the logistic angle as it was relevant to the post. :) But yeah, I concur. IIRC the issue Napoleon had with Davout's manoeuvre is that it risked the Guard, and he didn't want to do that so deep within Russia. We could talk about that forever but I think we're already waaaaaay off topic :P

But your figure of three years is interesting because I've read a book on the Austrian campaign of 1809 (I always hate it when I don't take down the names of books to buy them if I move away from the library they're in!!), which suggests the wheels were starting to fall off even then. Certainly it was the first campaign in which he suffered an actual, formal defeat, and in which the successes he won began to look Pyrrhic.

[chiroho.livejournal.com]

Yes, I think we've definitely gone down a rabbit hole on this one. Feel like I should start looking around for Alice!

The book I have is Armies on the Danube: 1809 by Scott Bowden, though not sure if that's the one you've read. You're right though that the tide started to turn in the Danube campaign of that year, with flaws developing over the last couple of years starting to tell, and mistakes in preparation leading to the defeat at Aspern-Essling.

Thanks for the interesting, if off topic, conversation. Don't run into too many people on here that are knowledgeable about the Napoleonic Wars.

[pathology-doc.livejournal.com]

I think mine was simply called "The Austrian Campaign of 1809" or "Napoleon's Austrian..." (etc.) I can't remember who wrote it.

Don't run into too many people on here that are knowledgeable about the Napoleonic Wars.

I could say the same about you! :) Alice is right over there; next to her husband (one of the guard), who's possibly about to depart for the Somme, poor bastard. *points mournfully*